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provision reserving the right of Sea-Land
to use another vessel "to perform all or
part of the carriage without giving notice
to the shipper. It also contained a provi
sion limiting liability to $500.00 per con
tainer for damage occurring during car
riage unless the shipper declared a higher
value on the face of the bill. Yang Ma
chine had not declared a higher value.
Yang Machine brought suit against Sea
Land in district court, bringing a summary
judgment motion for damages in the
amount of $241,700. Sea-Land cross-mo
tioned for summary judgment, to limit its
liability to $1,000.00 based on the con
tract and 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 304(5).
The lower court granted Yang Machine's
motion, finding Sea-Land had unreason
ably deviated by its restowage of cargo
aboard the Sea/and Patriot. On appeal,
the ninth circuit reversed, holding that
Sea-Land had not unreasonably deviated
from the contract and Yang Machine had
failed to exercise its option to declare
value beyond the $500 limitation. The ap
peals court remanded, limiting Sea-Land's
liability.
The question before the appeals court
was whether Sea-Land's transfer of Yang
Machine's cargo from the Merchant
Prince to the Sea/and Patriot constituted
an unreasonable deviation, ousting Sea
Land from the $500 package limitation of
46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5).
Under COGSA,carrier liability for dam
age to cargo is limited to $500 per pack
age. This limitation does not exist if either
an unreasonable deviation from the terms
of the bill of lading occurs, or if the ship
per has not been afforded the opportunity
to declare a value exceeding the $500
package limit.
The ninth circuit first discussed the dis
trict court's assertion that Sea-Land unrea
sonably deviated because the bill of lading
did not contain a transshipment clause,
which allows a carrier to transfer cargo
from one vessel to another during car
riage. The district court opined that the
transfer from one ship to another violated
the contract. The ninth circuit found that
Clause 3 in the bill of lading gave Sea
Land the right to use another vessel to
complete all or part of the voyage and pro
vided sufficient notice to Yang Machine
of that possibility. Clause 3 in Sea-Land's
bill, although not containing the word
"transshipment," contained language
found in bills of lading of other major carFall1995
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riers which the district court agreed
contained sufficient notice of potential
transshipment. Using a substitute ves
sel for completion of the voyage was.
the appeals court held, a transshipment
and not a deviation from the contract of
carriage.
Yang Machine contended that Clause
3 in Sea-Land's bill of lading was a
"liberty clause.'' A liberty clause is a
clause which may be unenforceable if it
gives a carrier unreasonable freedom to
alter aspects of carriage. In evaluating
the content of Clause 3,the ninth circu �
determined that the clause contained
two separate and distinct paragraphs.
Although the first paragraph contained
language found in a typical liberty
clause, the second, containing language
permitting Sea-Land to use a substitute
vessel for all or part of the carriage, was
enforc'eable, since it did not contain
typical liberty clause language.
The limitation under COGSA would
not have been available, the court also
stated, if the shipper had not been given
"fair opportunity" to declare a value
higher than $500. The court was un
convinced by Yang Machine's claim
that the limitation ofliability provisions
noted on the bill prevented it from
declaring actual value, since the shipper
had never inquired into making a decla
ration of higher value. Yang Machine's
contention regarding lack of opportu
nity was further weakened by the fact
that the company had previously
shipped via Sea-Land on many occa
sions and never contested the limitation
clause in the bill nor attempted to de
clare higher value. The shipper's fail
ure to claim higher value was probably
prompted, the court observed, by an
economic decision, since it would have
had to pay higher fees to insure the
cargo beyond the express limitation.
This rationale was supported by the fact
that Yang Machine separately insured
the cargo, receiving payment from its
insurer after the cargo was damaged.
Harry C. Demiris, Jr.
Class of 1 998

Seaman's Damages
N O P UNITIVE DAM AG ES FOR
FAIL URE TO P AY
M AIN TEN AN CE & CURE TO
JON ES ACT SEAM AN
Ni nth ci rcui t award s reasonable at
torney's fees- but not p uni ti ve d am
ages- on clai m for wi llful and p ersi s
tent fai lure of emp loyer to ei ther i n
vesti gate mai ntenance and cure clai m
or to p ay mai ntenance.
(Glynn

v.

Roy AI Boat Management

Corp. , CA9, 57 F.3d 1495, 6121195)

Christopher Glynn (Glynn) was hired
as a crew member in late January 1 992
by Daniel 1. Shawhan (Shawhan), cap
tain and master of the FN No Problem,
a boat owned by Roy AI Boat Manage
ment Corporation (Roy AI). Glynn
signed a written agreement which stated
terms of his employment, such as the
compensation arrangement, grounds for
termination, etc. While the No Problem
was docked in Honolulu, Hawaii, Glynn
was fired for coming late to work.
Glynn brought suit under the Jones Act
and general maritime law, alleging he
had sustained injuries while he was a
crew member of the No Problem. The
jury returned verdicts favoring Glynn
on his claims for unseaworthiness, neg
ligence and maintenance against both
Roy AI and Shawhan, finding both to be
Jones Act employers. (The court had
left the issue of whether or not Shawhan
was an employer to the jury.) The jury
also awarded punitive damages after de
termining defendants
had
acted
"arbitrarily, willfully, and with bad
faith" in neglecting to provide mainte
nance and cure. The district judge
granted judgment n.o.v. in favor of de
fendants on the issue of punitive dam
ages on the basis that such damages
were unavailable as a matter of law, but
awarded attorney's fees on the claim for
maintenance and cure. The court denied
Glynn prejudgment interest since he had
failed to request that the jury consider
the question. Plaintiff and defendants
appealed to the ninth circuit.
The main issues in the case involved
determination of who was Glynn's true
Jones Act employer; whether attorney's
XVIIR AC5
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fees were available under a claim for
maintenance and cure; and whether the
Supreme Court's Miles decision and
ninth circuit precedent precluded punitive
damages on a general maritime action.
The ninth circuit noted that in order for
Glynn to recover under the Jones Act he
had to show a defendant was his em
ployer. Cosmopolitan Shopping Co. v.
McAllister, 337 U.S. 783,787 n.6 ( 1 949).
The district court had found as a matter of
Jaw that an employer/employee relation
ship existed between Glynn and Roy AI.
The ninth circuit rejected Roy Al's argu
ment that the jury could have found
Glynn to be a joint venturer or indepen
dent contractor on the basis of the com
pensation arrangement, which was based
on a receipt of a percentage of profits.
The appellate court concluded that no rea
sonable jury could have found factually
that Glynn was anything other than an
employee, considering several factors
such as payment, direction, supervision
and source of power to hire and fire.
Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda Lines, Ltd., 931
F.2d 23 1 , 236 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
u.s. 9 1 9 ( 1 99 1 ).
The appeals court also concluded that
the district court had erred in submitting
defendant Shawhan's employer status as
a j ury question. The court stated that,
since there could only be one employer
for the purposes of the Jones Act and that
it had already been determined that Roy
AI was Glynn' s employer, the j ury should
not have been permitted to consider the
question of whether or not Shawhan was
also Glynn's employer.
With respect to the issue of whether
Glynn was entitled to attorney's fees, the
ninth circuit noted that it was well estab
lished, since Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527 ( 1 962), that an injured seaman
could recover attorney's fees where de
fendant had acted willfully and persis
tently in failing to pay maintenance and
cure. The court treated the issue as aban
doned by defendant Roy AI, since it did
not seriously contest the issue of its
"willful and persistent" failure to either
investigate Glynn's claim or pay mainte
nance.
The appeals court, instead, focussed on
Glynn's assertion that the lower court had
not properly set the level of fees on his
claim. The court determined that the
lower court did not abuse its discretion in
fixing the amount of fees awarded and
Fal l1995
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that the amount awarded was reason
should be awarded punitive damages in
able, affirming the result. The ninth
addition to attorney' s fees since attor
circuit observed with approval that the
ney's fees alone were a powerful incen
district court, in fixing the fees, had
tive deterring employers from willfully
used factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen
and arbitrarily refusing to pay mainte
Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70
nance and cure.
(9th Cir. 1 975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
As to other issues raised, the court
95 1 ( 1 976), such as time and labor re
ruled that Glynn's failure to submit the
quired, novelty and difficulty of the
question of prejudgment interest to the
question involved, skill necessary to jury served as a waiver on his prejudg
pursue the claim, preclusion of other
ment entitlement and that the district
employment, etc.
court had not erred in finding that a
The ninth circuit focussed in the criti
magistrate could not order payment of
cal part of its opinion on the issue of maintenance and cure as a condition for
whether the district court had erred in
lifting a default against defendants. The
finding that Glynn was not entitled to
lower court had found that there was a
disputed issue of fact as to whether any
punitive damages on the maintenance
injury had befallen Glynn aboard the
and cure claim. The court, in its analy
sis, relied on Miles v. Apex Marine
No Problem, which required a determi
Corp. , 498 U.S. 1 9 ( 1 990), concluding
nation before he could prevail and,
therefore, such an action by the magis
that punitive damages are not recover
able for defendant's willful, 'arbitrary trate would have been premature.
and persistent failure to pay mainte
Alexia I. Panteris
nance and cure. Glynn v. Roy At Boat
Management Corp. , 57 F.3d 1 495,
Class of 1 996
1 505. The court extended the Miles ra
tionale l imiting nonpecuniary recovery
0
0
0
to general maritime causes of action on
the theory that such recovery was not
COGSA Carriers
provided for in the "uniform plan of
maritime tort law Congress created."
CH ARTERER CAN BIND VESSEL
The appeals court rejected Glynn's ar
OWNER DESP ITE CH ARTER
gument that it should not abandon the
P ARTY INDEM NITY CL AUSE BY
ninth circuit's recognition of punitive
SIG NING "FOR TH E M ASTER"
damages for failure to pay maintenance
and cure under the pre-Miles precedent
Charter party authorizing charterer
of Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th
to sign for master could bind vessel
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 9 1 4
owner as COG SA carrier even
( 1 987). The court pointed out that the
though charter party ex pressly
language in Evich supporting plain
incl ud ed ind emnification provision;
tiffs position was dictum. The ninth
shippers f ail ed to meet fifth circuit
circuit expressly refused to follow the
privity stand ard or makeprima facie
fifth circuit' s opinion in Guevara v.
bailment cl aim against owner.
Maritime Overseas Corp., 34 F.3d
1 279 (5th Cir. 1 994), where the court
(Thyssen Steel Company v. MIV Kava
upheld a punitive damage award for
Yerakas, CA5, 50 F.3d 1349, 4127195)
failure to pay maintenance and cure.
The ninth circuit noted that decisions
Thyssen Steel Company (Thyssen)
upholding punitive damages relied
entered
into a contract with Europe
"directly or indirectly" on the Vaughan
Overseas Steamship Lines (Eurolines)
case. The Supreme Court in that case
to carry steel from Europe to Texas
had acknowledged for the first time
aboard the ship MN Kava Yerakas,
that damages for failure to give mainte
which had been time chartered to
nance and cure may include "necessary
Eurolines by its owner, Dodekaton
expenses, including attorney's fees,
Corporation (Dodekaton). Pursuant to
when the failure to pay maintenance is
loading the cargo of steel pipe, bills of
willful and persistent." Glynn, 57 F.3d
lading were issued and signed by the
at 1 504. The ninth circuit concluded
Eurolines agent "for the master."
that there is no reason why the plaintiff
XVII RAC6

